

Some unpalatable food for UK thought into 2025?

There will be those familiar with the "script" I follow in chronicling the origins of QuantMetriks (née Margin-Call), when first launched back in the summer of 1996. These will know it involves "boasting" about its initial "hits" at predicting 'earnings misses". Indeed, by it "red flagging" the earnings being provided by the managements of Powerscreen Internation, GEI and Wickes, "the system" anticipated the accounting frauds that would engulf all three. The resulting share price collapses/suspensions proved very costly to the many UK - particularly Scottish-based – funds which had weightings in them. These early successes help provide a "proof of concept" - a "triple stroke of luck?" - which "the system" was most grateful for. They also gave us the creative basis for the strapline "Don't be too long of stocks on the system's short-list of likely warners".

With the last line very much in mind, I wanted to close the year and open the next, with the latest data collected by "the system".

Remarkably, of the great many earnings signals currently being derived from it, the most curious of all happens to be somewhat counter intuitive. Before I reveal what shocking earnings shocks "the system" is foretelling, let me first set the backdrop.

Those who consume such economic stuff will be well-aware of the endless column inches and broadcast minutes warning of a looming UK recession. And to be clear as far as "the system's" granular data is concerned, there is no shortage of evidence to support the idea that Q4 was a rather poor period for earnings momentum across a wide range of UK-based sectors (sectors that is, in the rather refined way we categorise matters). Indeed, nowhere are earnings momentum signs more concerning than across swathes of UK engineering. And though automotive related markets appear particularly alarming (Dowlais?), the earnings signals have also been quite cautionary for those making mechanical products. Now, to be clear, when it comes to the fortunes of the UK's listed engineers, I tend to defer to the German data as being "the daddy" of European manufacturing (data we of course have at our fingertips). Anyway, I digress.

Let me return then to the intended dramatic point of this end of year piece. The counter-intuitive revelation that the most recent data provides us with is the following. **TESCO will, if not profit warn, almost certainly disappoint with its numbers when it reports on January 9th. For the record, SAINSBURY updates on the 10th, Ocado following four days later.**

How on earth can I be so confident in making such a startling specific claim concerning Tesco? Well, TSCO is the UK's grocery market "daddy". Not only do we know as much from the market share of its eponymous stores, but it also happens to own the "wholesaler" Booker (Makro), and by virtue of that acquisition, the Londis, Budgens and Premier "symbol brands" of convenience food stores; these competing of course alongside the Tesco Express marque.

Now, if you look at any of the tear-sheets relating to what Tesco does, they are all rather unpleasant upon the earnings eye. Whether one considers large supermarkets, convenience or speciality food stores we see volumes ending '24 down year-on-year, and so too margins; "organic" year on year revenue growth non-existent. Were these pictures not unpleasant enough for Tesco, we also see the home-delivery of predominantly food performing comparatively poorly; a far cry from the spectacularly strong growth when we were locked-down. We mustn't forget to overlay the added cost burden for the UK's grocery sector coming from Chancellorial changes to ENICs and the Minimum Wage. To repeat then all in all, earnings matters have become rather worrying for Tesco, the UK's "grocery daddy".

Let me once more stress that the above is not to claim matters are particularly pleasing elsewhere across UK plc. It merely points out that if you think the earnings of "food retailers" are "nicely defensive", the most recent reliable data suggests you will be disappointed in what "you will be fed on in the new year". Of course, as the saying goes, all things are relative. My point is that, if the likes of Tesco and Sainsbury "enjoy" a defensive driven rally, this will



come against the backdrop of ALL THE MORE elevated PE's BECAUSE "prospective E's" do not prove what were "pencilled in by analysts".

Just to be perfectly clear, the clarion of concern calling for Tesco is also sounding for the likes of Sainsbury and Simply Food (MKS). As for the market share erosion coming from Lidl and Aldi, well that is hardly making matters better for the UK's "traditional" grocery giants. For that matter, it can be claimed that matters at now "private" Morrisons and Asda will provide another line of caution towards a new price war on UK grocery lined shelves.

What then of the suppliers of all manner of prepared foods that fill shelves (PFD, Cranswick, Greencore, Kerry, Bakkavor, Saputo (in which Dairy Crest now exists) *etc*)? For these margins appear to be generally stable/strengthening, particularly for those involved in processing and producing dairy goods, meats and ambient foods. Matters are far from good however for the "doe made in bread", albeit these mere crumbs for ABF, with its Allied Mills and Allied Bakeries divisions. Interestingly the evidence is such that for the likes of Domino's Pizza and Greggs ingredient costs are easing, albeit their labour costs inflating.

Let's now try to answer the question: WHY matters look so poor for the UK's "grocers"? Well, that is rather easy to explain. The UK's grocers are seeing their market eaten-into by the rapidly expanded delivery of prepared foods; fast-meals, but with a move even more towards mid-market restaurant quality. Indeed, whilst we can get a slight visual on this with the data for the wholesale and retail business aspects of "Food Services", the growth has been such that it is very much running ahead of the speed at which the ONS collects such data.

In short, not only is the data looking alarming for TSCO and SBRY, but also Ocado, all of whom are losing at the expense of the likes of Deliveroo, UberEats, Dominos etc.

Please bear in mind neither Tesco nor Sainsbury have come anywhere close to vertically integrating their giant "retail grocery" businesses. Integrating that is, "backwards" into the wholesale food markets that generally supply ingredients to those who prepare the meals we are increasingly having delivered to our home or work doors.

True, light and dark kitchens do source from Tesco, particularly its Booker business, and even from Sainsbury. Such kitchens are however far more likely to buy more competitively in wholesale volumes from the likes of Brake Brothers (now owned by US listed Sysco) as well as the myriad of private, often family owned, food suppliers across the UK. And so yes, TSCO and SBRY will have to integrate, it just might take a warning or two to wake them up to the idea. Now, although, Tesco has a 'bit of previous' with Booker, here is a curious bit of detail. A stakeholder in Sainsbury is the privately owned food wholesaler Bestway, the latter in fact its fifth largest shareholder. Elsewhere, the US food giant Costco has a discernible presence in UK food wholesale, and so does South Africa's BidCorp, through Bidfood. The question for 2025 then is simply this, "Can the UK's supermarket giants afford to resist vertical integration?".

So, there you have it. Some food for thought of a most controversial kind for early next year. *Every Little Helps*.

PS Having opened this short piece rather boastfully, I will close with a balance of humility, doing so by returning to the strapline "Don't be too long of stocks on the system's short-list of likely warners".

Not long after gaining plaudits for calling-out the hat-trick of scandalous accounting fakes noted earlier, the then Margin-Call, took something of a curious knock.

Having cautioned that the well-liked and widely owned APV was facing trading difficulties in the metal fabrication markets it operated within, a profit warning duly came. This was accompanied however by a recommended takeover by Siebe, at a generous share price premium. In the time since then, many other earnings surprises have hit but done so alongside takeovers that have more than rescued investors. Moving away from memory lane to the present, "the system", is very much curious to know the following. How has Breedon Group managed to "miss" on the tough trading in the UK ready-mix concrete and aggregates businesses that it operates within? Put differently, "will it miss forecast earnings?".






Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets Supermarkets 2.9 (1.0)


Supermarkets 0.2 (0.1)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume




Price 3.1 (0.8) Cost 2.9 (0.9) Volume -0.1 (0.0)


Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Weights: Home material cost 36.0%, Imported Material cost 15.0%, Transport cost 10.0%, Labour cost 16.0%, Bought-in cost 6.0%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation





2018

Supermarkets On-Line element (52.11/2o)

2020


Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets Supermarkets On-Line 15.6 (0.6)

Supermarkets On-Line 1.3 (0.4)

2022

2024

2026



Price 3.1 (0.8) Cost 1.8 (0.4) Volume 12.5 (0.4)


Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics

2016

₋₆ **J** 2010

2012

2014



Weights: Home material cost 32.0%, Imported Material cost 13.0%, Transport cost 20.0%, Labour cost 16.0%, Bought-in cost 6.0%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation





Chart 2. Operating margin




Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets

Large Supermarkets 3.3 (0.9)


Large Supermarkets 0.4 (0.2)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume



Price 3.4 (0.9) Cost 3.0 (0.9) Volume -0.1 (0.0)

Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Weights: Home material cost 43.0%, Imported Material cost 20.0%, Transport cost 7.0%, Labour cost 16.0%, Bought-in cost 2.0%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation





Chart 2. Operating margin




Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets

Convenience grocers 2.9 (0.5)


Convenience grocers 0.1 (0.1)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume



Price 3.1 (0.8) Cost 3.0 (0.8) Volume -0.1 (0.0)

Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Weights: Home material cost 50.0%, Imported Material cost 15.0%, Transport cost 7.0%, Labour cost 12.0%, Bought-in cost 3.0%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation






Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets Specialist food & alcohol retailers 4.7 (0.4)

Specialist food & alcohol retailers -0.4 (-0.2)


Chart 3. Price, cost & volume



Price 2.9 (0.6) Cost 3.3 (1.0)

Volume 1.7 (0.2)

Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics




Weights: Home material cost 65.0%, Imported Material cost 10.0%, Transport cost 5.0%, Labour cost 12.0%, Bought-in cost 2.0%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation

Volume

8.0 (0.2)


UK Food & beverage serving sectors (56)




^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation

Wages


3.3 (0.8)




^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation




^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation




^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation




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



^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation





^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation

UK Retailing Internet Penetration (RIP)













UK Retailing Internet Penetration (RIP)















Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets
Assemblers of motor vehicles & their engines 2.9 (0.2)

Assemblers of motor vehicles & their engines -0.

-0.5 (-0.2)





Weights: Material & Fuel cost 58.4%, Labour cost 25.9%, Service cost 6.8%


Export share 63.9% Price 1.6 (0.5)
Cost 2.2 (0.8)
Volume 1.3 (0.1)

Cost 2.2 (0.8)

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation


German based Producers of motor vehicles & their engines 34.1

Chart 1. Operating sales, €




Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets
Producers of motor vehicles & their engines 3.1 (0.2)

Chart 2. Operating margin





Producers of motor vehicles & their engines 0.5 (0.1)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume



Price 1.4 (0.9) Cost 0.9 (0.1) Volume 1.7 (0.1)







Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets

Manufacturers of mechanical products 4.0 (0.3)


Manufacturers of mechanical products 1.3 (0.2)





Price 2.7 (0.7) Cost 1.4 (0.2) Volume 1.3 (0.1)






Weights: Material & Fuel cost 47.1%, Labour cost 36.1%, Service cost 5.8%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation

German based Manufacturers of mechanical products 29


Chart 1. Operating sales, €



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets


Manufacturers of mechanical products 3.1 (0.3)

Chart 2. Operating margin




Manufacturers of mechanical products 0.2 (0.1)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume




Price 2.2 (1.1) Cost 2.0 (0.5) Volume 1.0 (0.1)



German based Producers of engines & turbines excl. aircraft & vehicle engines 29.11

Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets ers of engines & turbines excl. aircraft & vehicle engines 2.9 (0.2)

2016

Producers of engines & turbines excl. aircraft & vehicle engines 29.11

2014

-40

-60

2006

2010

2012

oducers of engines & turbines excl. aircraft & vehicle engines 1.7 (0.3)





Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics




Price 1.7 (0.8) Cost -0.1 (0.0) Volume 1.2 (0.1)

German based Producers of pumps & compressors 29.12

Chart 1. Operating sales, € 30 20 10 10 -20 -30 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024


Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets
Producers of pumps & compressors 3.0 (0.3)

- Producers of pumps & compressors 29.12




Price 2.1 (0.9) Cost 0.1 (0.0) Volume 1.0 (0.1)

Chart 2. Operating margin



Producers of pumps & compressors 2.0 (0.4)




German based Producers of taps & valves 29.13

Chart 1. Operating sales, € 25 20 15 10 % change, yr-on-yr 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022


Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets

Producers of taps & valves 3.0 (0.5)




Price 3.0 (1.4) Cost 0.5 (0.1) Volume 0.0 (0.0)

Chart 2. Operating margin



Producers of taps & valves 2.5 (0.6)



German based Producers of bearings, gears, clutches, gearing & driving elements 29.14

Chart 1. Operating sales, €





Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets of bearings, gears, clutches, gearing & driving elements 3.0 (0.3)

cers of bearings, gears, clutches, gearing & driving elements 0.1 (0.0)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume





Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Price 2.0 (0.9) Cost 1.9 (0.4) Volume 1.0 (0.1)

German based Producers of machinery for mining, quarrying & construction 29.52


-30

-40 -50

2006

2008

Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets ducers of machinery for mining, quarrying & construction 3.9 (0.3)

2016

--- Producers of machinery for mining, quarrying & construction 29.52

2014

2012

Producers of machinery for mining, quarrying & construction 2.4 (0.3)






Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Price 2.2 (1.2) Cost -0.2 (0.0) Volume 1.7 (0.1)


German based Producers of electric motors, generators & transformers 31.1

Chart 1. Operating sales, €




Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets Producers of electric motors, generators & transformers 3.2 (0.3)

Producers of electric motors, generators & transformers 31.1




Price 1.9 (0.9) Cost -0.2 (0.0) Volume 1.2 (0.1)

Chart 2. Operating margin



Producers of electric motors, generators & transformers 2.2 (0.4)



UK based Producers of ready mixed concrete 26.63

Chart 1. Operating sales, £




Chart 2. Operating margin



Annual Growth Averages (%) and Inverse Coefficient of variance* in brackets Producers of ready mixed concrete 4.1 (0.3)

Producers of ready mixed concrete 1.2 (0.3)

Chart 3. Price, cost & volume





Chart 4. Detailed price & cost dynamics



Weights: Material & Fuel cost 33.4%, Labour cost 26.6%, Service cost 29.5%

Price 4.2 (0.7) Cost 3.0 (1.0) -0.1 (0.0) Volume

Export share 0.7%

^{*} Inverse Coefficient of Variance = Mean / Standard Deviation



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